Physicalism - Non-reductive Physicalism

Non-reductive Physicalism

The earliest forms of physicalism, growing historically out of materialism, were reductionist. But after Donald Davidson introduced the concept of supervenience to physicalism, non-reductionist physicalism became more popular.

Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are caused by physical states they are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. of a different ontological class).

Nonreductive physicalism has been especially popular among philosophers of biology and some biologists, who argue that all biological facts are fixed by physical facts but that biological properties and regularities supervene on so many multiple realizations of macromolecular arrangements that the biological is not reducible to the physical. Prominent exponents of this view are Philip Kitcher and Elliot Sober. Alexander Rosenberg introduced Davidson's notion to the debate in 1978 but thereafter argued against nonreductive physicalism in ways similar to Jaegwon Kim's. There are several varieties of non-reductive physicalism; some of which are opposed to each other.