Pompey - Campaign Against The Pirates

Campaign Against The Pirates

Two years after his consulship, Pompey was offered command of a naval task force to deal with piracy in the Mediterranean Sea. The conservative faction of the Senate remained suspicious and wary of him; this seemed yet another illegal or at least extraordinary appointment. Pompey's supporters for this command – including Caesar – were in the minority, but support was whipped up through his nomination by the Tribune of the Plebs Aulus Gabinius who proposed a Lex Gabinia; Pompey should have control over the sea and the coasts for 50 miles inland. This would set him above every military leader in the East – it was passed despite vehement opposition.

According to Rome's historians, pirates had freely plundered the coastal cities of Greece, Asia and Italy itself. The extent and nature of their threat is questionable; anything that threatened Rome's grain supply was cause for panic. Roman public opinion and Pompey's supporters may have exaggerated the solution . Various settlements, peoples and city-states around the Mediterranean had coexisted several centuries and most had operated small fleets for war, or trade in commodities, including slaves. Their alliances might be loose and temporary or more-or-less permanent; some regarded themselves as nations.

With Rome's increasing hegemony, the independent maritime economies of the Mediterranean would have been further marginalised; an increasing number would have resorted to piracy. As long as they met Rome's increasing requirement for slaves, left her allies and territories untouched and offered her enemies no support, they were tolerated. Some were subsidised. But fear of piracy was potent – and these same pirates, it was later alleged, had assisted Sertorius.

By the end of that winter, the preparations were complete. Pompey allocated one of thirteen areas to each of his legates, and sent out their fleets. In forty days, the western Mediterranean was cleared. Dio reported communication was restored between Hispania, Africa, and Italy; and that Pompey then attended to the largest of these alliances, centered on the coast of "Rough Cilicia". After "defeating" its fleet, he induced its surrender with promises of pardon, and settled many of its people at Soli, which was henceforward called Pompeiopolis.

De Souza (2002) finds that Pompey had officially returned the Cilicians to their own cities, which were ideal bases for piracy and not – as Dio would have it – for the dignified reformation of pirates as farmers. Pompey's entire campaign is therefore in question; its description as "war" is hyperbole – some form of treaty or payoff is likely, with Pompey as chief negotiator. This was standard practice, but undignified and seldom acknowledged; Rome's generals were supposed to wage and win wars. A decade on, in the 50's BC, the Cilicians and pirates in general remained a nuisance to Rome's sea trade.

In Rome, however, Pompey was hero; once again, he had guaranteed the grain supply. According to Plutarch, by the end of the summer of 66 BC, his forces had swept the Mediterranean clear of opposition. Pompey was hailed as the first man in Rome, Primus inter pares (the first among equals). Cicero could not resist a panegyric:

"Pompey made his preparations for the war at the end of the winter, entered upon it at the commencement of spring, and finished it in the middle of the summer."

The expedience of his campaign probably guaranteed Pompey his next and even more impressive command, this time in Rome's long-running war against Mithridates. By the 40's BC, Cicero could comment less favourably on the pirate campaign, and especially the funded "resettlement" at Soli/Pompeiopolis; "we give immunity to pirates and make our allies pay tribute."