Spring Offensive - Strategic Impact

Strategic Impact

The Kaiserschlacht series of offensives had yielded large territorial gains for the Germans, in First World War terms. However, victory was not achieved and the German armies were severely depleted, exhausted and in exposed positions. The territorial gains were in the form of salients which greatly increased the length of the line that would have to be defended when allied reinforcements gave the allies the initiative. In six months, the strength of the German army had fallen from 5.1 million fighting men to 4.2 million. By July the German superiority of numbers on the Western Front had sunk to 207 divisions to 203 Allied, a lead which would be reversed as more American troops arrived. German manpower was exhausted. The German High Command predicted they would need 200,000 men per month to make good the losses suffered, but even by drawing on the next annual class of eighteen year olds, only 300,000 recruits would be available for the year. Even worse, they lost most of their best trained men: stormtrooper tactics had them leading the attacks. Even so, about a million German soldiers remained tied up in the east until the end of the war, attempting to run a short-lived addition to the German Empire in Europe. German political ambitions remained extravagant until the very end.

The Allies had been badly hurt but not broken. The lack of a unified high command was partly rectified by the appointment of Marshal Foch to the supreme command, and coordination would improve in later Allied operations. American troops were for the first time used as independent formations and had proven themselves. Their presence counterbalanced the serious manpower shortages that Britain and France were experiencing after four years of war.

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